

On September 30, 2026, the SEC proposed the most significant changes to Rule 23c-3, the interval fund rule, since its adoption in 1993. Interval funds could offer repurchases every month, and the bright-line test for how much cash a fund must hold ahead of each repurchase would give way to a judgment standard. Comments are due in early December.
More frequent liquidity sounds like better liquidity. But how often a fund opens its repurchase window says little about whether it can meet it. That depends on the underlying assets.
The proposal adds a one-month interval to today's three-, six-, and twelve-month options. The 5 percent minimum would apply to every offer, so a monthly fund would have to offer at least 5 percent of its shares each month. If every offer were filled and no new money came in, twelve monthly offers would return nearly half of a fund's starting shares in a year, compared with under a fifth for a quarterly fund. The SEC has asked whether the monthly floor should be lowered to 2 percent, and most existing exemptive orders that permit 2 percent monthly offers would be rescinded after a one-year compliance period.
The proposal would also drop the requirement to hold liquid assets equal to 100 percent of the repurchase offer between notification and pricing. Instead, funds would manage liquidity so they can meet repurchases without selling investments at prices that deviate significantly from their value. The rule would stop prescribing cash and start asking funds to avoid fire sales. Other changes include up to two years before a new fund's first offer, annual discretionary offers, open-end-style treatment of sales loads, and multiple share classes for closed-end funds and BDCs.
The proposal arrives during the first real test of semi-liquid private credit. Through August 2026, credit interval fund redemptions rose nearly 89 percent from a year earlier to $9.6 billion, or 79 percent of gross sales1. Several large funds have received requests well above their 5 percent offers and prorated. Private credit now makes up roughly half of interval fund net assets, according to the Federal Reserve. The structure is working as designed, protecting remaining shareholders from forced sales, but advisors are now focused on how liquidity is produced, not just how it is described.
First, frequency does not create liquidity. A monthly window on a portfolio that produces cash quarterly just shows the queue sooner, and very few private credit portfolios could meet a 5 percent monthly floor from their own cash flow. In practice, the funds best placed to offer monthly windows are those with strong net inflows, which can net new money against requests. The flexibility helps most when it is needed least. Paying faster with borrowed money or forced sales does not clear a queue either. It shifts losses to the shareholders who stay, which rewards leaving early and can lengthen the line. When requests exceed the offer, each requesting shareholder receives a pro-rata share of what they asked to redeem, not 5 percent of their position. On a monthly schedule, that could happen twelve times a year.
Second, the 100 percent test was blunt, but anyone could check it. It cost return in cash drag, yet it gave advisors and boards a clear line. A principles-based standard moves that judgment inside the fund. That is a reasonable trade, and it puts the burden on advisors to ask more questions.
Every interval fund pays for repurchases from five sources: cash set aside, new subscriptions, borrowing, asset sales, and assets that repay on their own. Cash costs return. Borrowing may postpone the problem and adds leverage. Selling under strain is what the proposed standard aims to prevent.
New subscriptions may do much of the work in normal markets. Netting inflows against redemptions is a legitimate feature of a continuously offered fund. But inflows depend on investor sentiment, which tends to turn just as redemptions rise. This year, net sales of credit interval funds fell 83 percent to $2.6 billion through August1. A source that shrinks when it is most needed cannot be the foundation. Only assets that repay on their own on a timeline that matches redemptions are truly built to consistently meet liquidity demands.
That is why the new standard is easiest to meet for a fund that seldom needs to sell. Loans with short maturities produce steady principal repayments that can fund repurchases at par, without waiting on new investors or a buyer's bid. There are interval funds that fit a short duration box, with maturities measured in months rather than years. These portfolios turn over largely through repayment, which can provide recurring repurchase cash while also testing the fund's marks against real payoffs on a continuous basis.
But there are limits that matter. Short maturities are not guaranteed repayments. In a stressed market some borrowers may extend, lengthening the book when liquidity is most valued. Short-duration lending narrows the gap between asset liquidity and promised liquidity, but the underlying assets are still private loans, and under extreme stress there is a chance a gap will remain.
Our view on the redemption proposal is pretty straightforward: adding monthly windows does nothing to address the differences between the natural illiquidity of private investments and the liquidity investors might want, without massive inflows in perpetuity. Offering 5% per month is not a structurally sound policy. There are very few, if any, private strategies built to support that level of liquidity over the long term.
The proposal is a sensible modernization of a rule written for a smaller market. But a repurchase schedule is a promise, and the assets are how a fund keeps it. As the rule shifts from a test anyone can check to a standard funds must manage, the key question for advisors is structural: does this portfolio generate its own liquidity, or does it depend on someone else providing it?
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